This paper studies how institutional characteristics of Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are related to their post-merger survival. SPACs are unique financial firms that conduct the IPO with the solely purpose to use the proceeds to acquire another private company. Paper finds that institutional characteristics of SPACs are important in determining post-merger outcomes of new company, specifically when it comes to their suvival/failure. Namely, increases in pre-merger commitment by SPAC stakeholders and initial positive market performance increase post-merger survival likelihood. On the contrary, mergers with higher transaction costs and focused on foreign companies exhibit increased failure likelihood.
Introduction
Going public is one of the most important strategic and financing decision of private companies. While theoretical underpinnings for the motives of the initial public offering (IPO) are well developed, the empirical literature is inconclusive both on the motives to go public and on the further investment decisions of these companies. Fairly unexplored motive to go public is providing financing for future acquisitions. Röell (1996) reports that the access to new finance, together with improved prospects for growth via new acquisitions, is the most important motive for going public. Pagano at al. (1995) finds that new companies use equity capital for financial acquisitions. Fama and French (2004) state that the market for new listed firms is a bellwether for the public equity market, but the frictions can cause some projects to be financed privately. They also argue that IPOs in their sample are more likely to be acquired than are seasoned firms.
Using unique sample of companies conducting an IPO, namely specified purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), with solely purpose to execute an acquisition in the future date within limited time, this paper presents additional evidence on the survival and acquisition frequency of IPOs, and determinants of these choices. Structurally, the merger of original SPAC is a dual event. It is an IPO event for some previously private domestic or foreign company while at the same time it represents an exit for original cash shell, and that is unique characteristics of these companies.
Strictly speaking this paper follows more closely on a string of unit IPO and IPO literature as Schultz (1993) , Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997) , , Bharba and Pettway (2003) , Fama and French (2004) , Carpentier and Suret (2011) and Chancharat, Krishnamurti, and Tian (2012) that examine how initial IPO characteristics determine survival of companies post-IPO. Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012) posit that the length and likelihood of survival have important implications for firm's stakeholders. In addition, the length of survival can help markets to efficiently price the company and to measure market performance. Finally, regulators can use survival statistics as a benchmark to assess their policies and listing rules. Schultz (1993) reports that after three years, 88.9% of firms that had share IPOs are still around, but only 58.8% unit IPOs. Hensler et al. (1997) find that the survival time for IPOs increases with size, the initial return, IPO activity level in the market, and the percentage of insider ownership. They report failure rate of 55.10% for their sample. report that the size of the IPO offering reduces the probability of the firm being acquired relatively to remain listed. They find the evidence that higher quality investment banks acting as underwriters increase likelihood of survival. In overall, 14.25% of the companies in their sample fail, and 17.00% are acquired. Bharba and Pettway (2003) find that initial prospectus information has higher predictive power to explain future survival/failure of companies than subsequent equity offerings and acquisitions. They report that 16.9% of the firms fail in five year period. Carpentier and Suret (2011) suggest that the size at the IPO and investment bank quality increase probability of survival. Fama and French (2004) report that 26.25% of companies delist and 15.92% of companies merge five years post IPO.
This study extends the literature on post-IPO survival in following ways. First, the paper documents survival rates for unique set of companies organized with solely purpose to acquire another company. Second, paper presents the evidence how institutional characteristics of SPAC determine their post-merged outcomes, specifically when it comes to their failures. Finally, paper contributes to the scant literature on SPACs providing new evidence on their post-merger outcomes and performance.
Modern specified purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) entered the U.S. capital markets in August 2003 when Millstream Acquisition Corporation successfully refurbished an old concept of blank checks and raised approximately $24 million to be used in financing of potential merger with at the time unknown company.
1 In finance literature, Jog and Sun (2007) conducted first study and adopted the definition of SPACs by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) according to which "a SPAC is created specifically to pool funds in order to finance a merger or acquisition opportunity within a set timeframe. The opportunity usually has yet to be identified."
SPACs are also often structured to avoid being legally subject to the additional requirements prescribed by the SEC to blank check companies. However, SPACs voluntarily incorporate many of regulatory requirements or some derivation of the requirements in order to attract investors.
2 Berger (2008) reports that SPACs can provide companies with access to the public markets in ways that traditional IPO cannot. SPACs are better solution than traditional IPO for transactions with complicated circumstances, where companies need immediate rebalancing of capital structure, for companies missing research coverage and companies with the lack of exit opportunities.
Following reinvention the SPAC concept proved resilient and at the peak of its activity in 2008, Ritter (2008) reports that SPACs were representing 34% of IPO market. Lewellen (2009) 1 David M. Nusbaum and EarlyBirdCapital are the pioneers of modern SPACs. They refurbished failed concept of blank check companies from 90'is in which Nusbaum and his company GKN Securities was one of the major underwriters and market makers. https://www.finra.org/newsroom/1997/nasd-regulation-fines-gkn-securities-and-29-brokers-725000-firm-must-also-pay-14 2 https://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm suggest that SPACs due to their unique structure and wide market acceptance should be treated as a separate asset class.
While SPACs experienced structural changes, since 2003, as reported Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) and Lakicevic et al. (2014) Dimitrova (2012) and Kolb and 3 Shultz (1993) , Jain (1994) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) outline theoretical reasons why companies use units to conduct the IPO. 4 Lewellen(2009) , Thompson (2010) confirm the lack of underpricing for SPACs entering financial markets in the U.S. Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahrenburg (2012) find no underpricing in the sample of European SPACs. Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) report that half of the SPACs are value destroying. 5 Notable exception is Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) Observing unique set of specified purpose companies this paper documents that SPACs' failure rate is at the level of 58.09%, higher than any previously reported failure rate in the post-IPO survival literature, and comparable only to Hensler et al. (1997) failure rates of 55.10% for general companies. In addition, the paper documents similarly to findings in Bharba and Pettway (2003) that prospectus and market characteristics of original companies have predictive power in respect to survival. That is especially valid for characteristics that are proxies for lowering of asymmetric information and moral hazard on behalf of managerial team, and for variables that are proxies for investment banking characteristics and post-merger performance. Paper does not confirm that IPO-size has predictive power on the post-merger survival. Finally, post-merger buy and hold returns of -40.00% are in level to reported returns of -42.90% in Dimitrova (2012) and shed an additional light on SPAC as an asset class.
Following introduction the paper is structured as follows: part two elaborates on data used in the paper; part three describes sample and empirical approach; part four discusses results and part five presents the conclusion.
Data
Data are obtained from various sources. the original SPAC is liquidated and the funds from escrow accounts are released to the current shareholders at pro-rata basis.
An important structural feature of SPACs in the merger approval process is qualified majority to approve merger. Lakicevic et al. (2013) proposed merger and decide to redeem their shares for cash the merger could not proceed. Cumming et al. (2014) reports that redemption threshold represents significant obstacle to secure positive vote on acquisition. Table 2 reports that, on average, the threshold in the sample is 32.25 % with median being 20%.
Approximately 79% SPACs in the sample had defined focus at the IPO date either targeting on particular industry from where their acquisition target would be or on particular country. Kim (2009) and Lakicevic et al. (2013) are reporting that focused SPACs have higher probability to successfully execute merger than SPACs which are not reporting acquisition focus. Tran (2010) finds that SPACs benefit from their acquisition focus which enables them to pay less for target than comparable acquirers. Table 2 reports that on average outside SPAC investor in the sample experiences initial share dilution at the IPO of 35.31%. 14 The crucial reasons for dilution are the issuance of in-the-money warrants at the IPO and the fact that SPAC managers maintain at least 20% of equity in SPAC after the IPO. Berger (2008) addition to the purchase of pre-IPO shares they commit additional funds to the SPAC by purchasing warrants. 16 In 69% of SPACs in the sample founders purchased warrants at full price and deposited all the proceeds from these warrants in the escrow accounts.
For 21% of SPACs in the sample founders are institution that is either connected with private equity fund or one of the managers is in parallel running private equity portfolio. This is an important feature as literature may recognize SPACs as private equity exit strategies or as an entrance into private equity to small investors. 17 Dimitrova (2012) hypothesize that targets choose 15 SPAC prospectuses reveal as founders among the others : Gilbert Amelio, Roland Berger, Tom Hicks, Joseph Perella, Ronald Perelman, Dan Quayle, George Tenet, Bruce Wasserstein, and Steve Wozniak 16 An excerpt from typical SPAC prospectus explains warrant purchases by stakeholders:" our sponsor and the underwriters will purchase an aggregate of 3,700,000 insider warrants (3,500,000 by our sponsor and 200,000 by the underwriters) from us at a price of $0.50 per warrant in a private placement pursuant. The insider warrants will be identical to the warrants sold in this offering except that if held by the original holders or their permitted assigns, they (i) may be exercised for cash or on a cashless basis; (ii) are not subject to being called for redemption so long as they are held by the initial holders; and will expire five years from the effective date of the registration statement, or earlier upon redemption or liquidation. In addition, the insider warrants will be held in escrow until 30 days following the consummation of our initial business transaction. 17 These are the excerpts from 424 forms filled by Aldabra Acquisition with the SEC regarding the private equity exit:
"Private equity firms have an ongoing need for investment realizations because most private equity funds are limited life investment vehicles that are continually seeking liquidity events for many of their portfolio companies. Accordingly, our principal strategy in sourcing our business combination will be to search for an attractive company held by such an investment fund. We believe that many private equity firms may find an acquisition by us to be an easier and less risky route to liquidity for their portfolio companies than going through an initial public offering. We believe many private equity firms will view the consummation of that merger (and the fact that the securities of Aldabra Acquisition Corporation have appreciated markedly since then) as a positive factor in considering whether or not to sell a portfolio company to us.
to be acquired by a SPAC because they need the financial resources but do not want to give up control to the private equity firm. Finally, for 33% of SPACs founders have previous experience in SPAC market.
Literature recognizes underwriters as the most important stakeholders in the SPAC market.
They act as advisers and market makers for securities throughout the entire lifecycle of the SPACs.
On average the size of underwriting syndicate is 3.46 members. Corwin and Schultz (2005) suggest that issuers benefit from including more underwriters in syndicate. At first underwriting of SPAC securities was a niche of small and middle size investment banks as EarlyBirdCapital and Morgan
Joseph. Once the market picked up large investment banks such as Citibank and Deutsche Bank joined the market. Table 2 reports that EarlyBirdCapital is involved as an underwriter in 28 deals and 70% of the SPACs are underwritten by these midsize investment banks. Following Lakicevic et al (2014) these midsize investment banks that started SPAC market are classified as high quality underwriters. Total reported underwriter's fee is 6.92 % and that is similar to findings in Chen and Ritter (2000) who report that significant majority of small IPO's in the U.S capital markets have spread of 7%. What is peculiar in the case of SPACs is that the total underwriter's fee is conditional on the success of the merger. On average 30% of the total underwriter's fee or 2.08% of total IPO proceeds are deferred until the merger outcome is known. In five SPACs underwriters also purchases warrants pre-IPO betting on the success of future merger. For 56% of SPACs the IPO is oversubscribed and shows the investors interest in the product.
The third group of characteristics describes pre-merger pricing of SPAC securities and merger institutional and financing characteristics. At the date of merger announcement an average market price of SPAC common share is $7.72 and the average warrant price is $0.95. Given previously reported statistics that SPAC issues unit at an average price of $7.96 and that unit has 1.33 warrants, simple calculation shows that an average SPAC investor holding one unit from the IPO date until the announcement of merger date experiences return of 12.85%. Once announcement takes place on average 204 calendar days are needed to complete the merger.
Following Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) GoodSPAC is defined as one priced in the market at the level above trust value of share at the merger date and 54% of SPACs in the sample satisfy that requirement.
The average size of merger is $233.83 million and it is 1.96 times higher than the original amount of money raised during the SPAC IPO and 2.08 times higher than the amount of cash available for merger after all SPAC administrative costs and deferred underwriters fees are paid.
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This is in line with Dimitrova (2012) who reports relative merger ratio of 1.91. To fully finance merger SPAC managers, who on average remain majority shareholders in 13% of deals and remain owners of 8% of new companies, use both equity and credit markets along direct bank financing.
Similarly to findings in Tran (2010) statistics show that SPACs rarely do tender offers especially in the earlier years. All SPACs in the sample issue some additional shares post-merger, most of them being used to redeem warrants exercised by investors and managerial teams. Bank financing is used by 21% of SPACs and debt financing is used by 25% of SPACs. In 8.00% of SPAC mergers managers pay finder fee to another institution that was crucial in finding acquisition target to them. Table 2 also reports performance of SPAC shares after the merger. Average buy and hold return one month after the merger is -3.00%, average return three months after the merger is -19.00% and average return one year after the merger is -40.00%. One year buy and hold return is similar to -42.90% reported in Dimitrova (2012) while observing 71 post-merger SPAC. Her paper reports one year buy and hold return Figure 3 reports performance of equally weighted index of all SPACs where merger date has value of zero on x-axis. The figure shows that index initially grows up and experiences a peak around acquisition date. Following acquisition date the index declines and reaches the bottom around 750 trading days after the merger. Lewellen (2009) believes that the initial decline is due to dilution and initial inability of investors to properly perceive shareholders structure post-merger. These results are similar to the findings of Ritter (1991) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) who examine large sample of IPO firms and report their underperformance in respect to matched sample three years after the IPO. This comparison is relevant for SPACs as their merger is in the same time an IPO for some previously private domestic or foreign company.
Finally, Table 2 reports whether post-merger SPACs provide dividend payments to shareholders and shows that on average 26.00% of these companies do pay dividends at least at one point of their corporate life. (2009) and Dimitrova (2012) are reporting that incentives of SPAC founders are aligned in a way to encourage them to execute merger. 19 Chancharat et al. (2012) find that the management team has positive role on the survival likelihood. Lakicevic et al. (2014) confirms that the increase in the number of members in SPAC team means higher merger likelihood. Similarly, the higher the purchase of warrants by SPAC managers, the higher is the managerial commitment to merger execution and post-merger survival likelihood.
Descriptive statistics of subsamples
Modern SPAC is an invention of underwriters. Their commitment to the success of the merger is crucial. Therefore the expectation is that the more costly are the fees charged by underwriters the lower is the level of their commitment and respectively the post-merger survival.
When it comes to the impact of the underwriting quality the hypothesis is that the involvement of high quality investment banks in the process would mean the higher likelihood of survival postmerger. The underwriting quality is determined following the approach in Lakicevic et al. (2014) where the variable is binary and coded as one if the lead underwriter belongs to the group of GoodSPAC is taking value of one if the SPAC was value creating at the moment of merger and zero otherwise. The hypothesis here is that being GoodSPAC at the date of merger would increase likelihood of survival.
It is unclear how the level of involvement of SPAC management and the level of ownership
after the merger would impact long term survival. The usual pattern is that post-merger at least two of original SPAC directors remain on the board of new company. In 13.00% of SPACs they represent the majority of directors on the board. It is possible that for mergers where previous SPAC managers are majority on the board post-merger that they would be continuously shopping on the markets, as likely their acquisition target was one of the companies from private equity portfolio. suggest that higher ownership should be associated with higher probability of survival. Dimitrova (2012) finds that that increasing sponsor ownership has positive impact on performance because sponsors have higher incentives to maximize firm value rather than expropriating shareholders wealth. She also reports that this positive impact cease to exist for post-merger SPACs where SPAC management ownership is higher than 13.20%.
One of the important factors impacting merger approval is behavior of SPAC management in respect to the warrants they are holding at the moment of merger and which would be exercised in the future. Schultz (1993) suggests that by issuing units and warrants firm precommit to a seasoned offering at the exercise price of money. Most of these warrants are in-the money especially for SPACs that went public before 2008. Dimitrova (2012) reports that extremely high levels of sponsor ownership are found to be detrimental for performance. The hypothesis here is that any SPAC management forfeiting warrants contributes to the success of the future company by lowering the costs and dilution, as new company would not need to issue new shares at low price to redeem these warrants.
There is no prediction how the sources of financing of merger would determine the likelihood of survival, but there is a clear negative prediction in the case that management pays finder fee to another institution to locate acquisition target for two reasons. First, by paying finder fee SPAC management shows inability to locate acquisition target by itself and increases moral hazard. Second, finder fee is paid using the funds from escrow account which leaves less funds to finance merger. (23) are acquired. Standard multinomial logistic regression is used to examine the impact of SPAC institutional and market characteristics on post-merger choices and results are reported in Table 5 .
Empirical Results and Analysis
This section discusses results of empirical tests conducted to determine the impact of the set of institutional and market characteristics of SPACs on their post-merger survival likelihood.
Logistic regression results
Logistic regression is used to determine the impact of a set of institutional and market characteristics on survival likelihood of post-merger SPACs. Similar empirical approach is used previously in Kim (2009) , Thompson (2010) , Cumming et al. (2014) and Lakicevic et al. (2014) 20 Figure 4a The results of logistic regression are reported in Table 4 . Reported Mc Fadden R square is 42.50% which is at the similar level to reported levels in Thompson (2010) , Cumming et al (2014) and Lakicevic et al. (2014) . Below is the discussion of results that are shown to have statistically significant impact on post-merger survival.
Survival likelihood of post-merger SPACs is positively dependent on managerial warrant purchases at IPO. This could be explained as stakeholders' commitment is seen as a tool to lower asymmetric information and moral hazard and that involvement increases the quality of initial acquisition. This is in agreement with findings at Chancharat et al. (2012) who report higher survival rates for companies with higher level of managerial involvement. Similarly, higher involvement of underwriters and the size of underwriters syndicate positively impacts the survival likelihood as the larger network of investment banks means potentially more resources committed to the merger.
Bank financing shows as statistically significant variable and suggests that SPACs which are bank financing merger have the higher probability to fail. It is possible that bank financing is the financing of the last resort and SPACs are only reaching for this source when they are unable to finance acquisition either in equity or debt market. In addition to the results of logistics regression Table 4 reports coefficients from standard survival Cox proportional hazard model. Finally the last three columns in Table 4 report coefficients from probit regression.
Multinomial logistic regression results
To take into account that prior SPACs classification that follows Bhabra and Pettway (2003) may not adequately recognize differences between companies that failed due to financial reasons and companies that were acquired the classification is adjusted as in .
Therefore the subsample of failed SPACs is divided into ones that failed due to their operating and financial troubles and ones that were acquired in the market. This division is more proper for the post-merger SPACs as it seems that acquired SPACs may share much more characteristics with Surviving SPACs than with Failed SPACs. To examine post-merger choices multinomial logistic regression is applied where base group is a subsample of post-merger SPACs still trading.
Regression results are presented in Table 5 and further will be discussed statistically significant variables.
In overall, the results suggest that important institutional and market characteristics explain post-merger outcomes analyzing Failed SPAC in respect to Surviving SPACs. Results do not report that any statistically significant difference exists between Surviving SPACs and Acquired SPACs. The likely explanation for the later finding is that acquirers in the market pick post-merger SPACs who are already established and not exhibiting visible signs of financial trouble or delisting. This explanation is along the line of Bhabra and Pettway (2003) that better performing IPO firms get acquired whereas the ones with poor performance fail to survive. Along the similar lines De and Jindra (2012) report that firms which do relatively well in terms of operating as well as stock performance and attract institutional investor interest are more likely to draw the attention of acquirers than firms thinking to delist.
The relative probability of SPAC failure relative to survival is higher for those SPACs that merged with foreign private company. One of the possible reasons for this is that more than half foreign SPACs were acquiring companies from China, and actions of the SEC in 2011 resulted in a number of them delisting from the U.S exchanges.
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Regression results suggest that stakeholder involvement is very important in determining survival likelihood of post-merger SPACs. The relative probability of SPAC failure rather than survival is lower for companies with higher number of executives in the team, for companies where managerial team purchase upfront warrants and companies with the larger number of underwriters in syndicate. This is in agreement with Hensler et al. (1997) who report that the level of insider ownership is positively related to probability of survival and with Chancharat et al. (2012) who report that the quality and independence of the board increases survival likelihood. Corwin and Schultz (2005) also document that issuers benefit from including more underwriters in syndicate.
21 See Beatty, Lu and Luo (2014) and Shachmurove and Vulanovic (2014) On the contrary, variables that increase the cost of initial merger and likely increase the degree of information asymmetry such as the level of underwriter fee and the level of deferred fee are suggested to increase the likelihood of failure. This is along the line with findings in Dimitrova (2012) that the short-term performance of SPAC acquirers is worse if a portion of the underwriting fees of the IPO underwriters is deferred and paid only upon the merger completion.
Interestingly, the quality of underwriters matters. Having high quality underwriter as defined in this paper does not increase the likelihood of survival. That means that post-merger SPACs promoted by investment banks which were the pioneers of SPAC market such as:
EarlyBirdCapital, Morgan Joseph, Ladenburg Thalmann, Chardan Markets, Maxim Group, Gun
Allen Financial are lacking the breadth of network, an access to institutional investors with long term interests that high quality investment banks as Citigroup and Deutsche Bank could offer to companies they sponsor. In that sense, the finding is in agreement with Jain and Kini (1999) and Carpentier and Suret (2011) who suggest that relationship with high quality banks increases survival likelihood.
Merger characteristics matter. Fining merger target earlier and announcing acquisition increases the likelihood of survival. Similarly it pays off to be GoodSPAC and have positive return around the acquisition. SPAC mergers that tend to be bank financed are less likely to survive postmerger. The relative probability of failure is also higher for SPACs that pay finder fee for the services of identifying acquisition target.
Finally, market performance one year after merger suggests that the probability of survival is higher for SPACs with higher returns. Also, post-merger SPACs that at least once payed dividend to shareholders are more likely to survive.
Conclusions
This paper documents how institutional characteristics of SPACs and their market performance determines their post-merger choices. Results suggest that prospectus characteristics that define SPACs predict their post-merger survival when these companies are classified following where acquired SPACs are separated from the subsample of failed SPACs.
In overall, SPACs failure rate is at the level of 58.09%, which is higher than any previously reported failure rate in the post-IPO survival literature, and comparable only to Hensler et al. (1997) failure rates of 55.10% for general companies. In addition, paper finds that prospectus and market characteristics of pre-merger SPACs have predictive power in respect to their post-merger survival especially: proxies for lowering of asymmetric information and moral hazard on behalf of managerial team, and proxies for investment banking characteristics and post-merger performance.
Finally, SPACs' portfolio exhibit significant negative post-merger buy and hold performance of -40.00% which put an additional light on valuation of post-merger SPACs and could suggest, similarly to findings in Dimitrova (2012) , that for some SPACs the incentives of stakeholders to collect their equity compensation and underwriting fees are prevailing motives in approving otherwise bad acquisitions. This figure reports overall performance of equaly weighted buy and hold SPAC index. The index is constructed assuming that individual investor purchases one share during SPAC IPO for each SPAC in the sample and holds these shares up to five years after SPAC merger. At first SPAC Index consist of one SPAC and at the moment of 173 trading days before the merger all 105 SPACs in the sample are included in the sample. The number of SPACs included in the index after the merger declines due to various corporate events as delisting, acquisition or going private transaction. Number of trading days
